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Teaching constitutional law qualifies for the highest offices of the state – that is an
almost unquestioned fact in Germany. In recent German history, this profession has
spawned two Federal Presidents, two Federal Ministers of the Interior, two Federal
Ministers of Justice, one Federal Minister of Defence and one Shadow Federal
Minister of Finance, not to mention the state level. That seems quite natural to most:
For someone who reflects on the legal basis of state action for a living, being in
charge of state action appears like basically turning theory into practice.
Party offices, however, is a different matter. To become the federal chairman of a
party was not a preferred path to political responsibility for legal academics. So far,
that is. Now, Matthias Herdegen, professor of public law at the University of Bonn
for some 28 years, has proclaimed his readiness to take over the chair of Germany’s
still largest and long-time governing party CDU from the incumbent, Chancellor
Angela Merkel – a breath-takingly ambitious jump from the musty seminar rooms
of Bonn right to the pinnacle of power, with no political experience whatsoever and
nothing but his publication list as a token of qualification. This is new, and it will be
interesting to watch how far he will get, as that might teach us a lot about the state of
the country and even more about that of constitutional jurisprudence.
Herdegen has published an op-ed in the FAZ this week in which he describes how
he wants to breathe new life into the CDU as a Volkspartei, a party of and for the
whole German people: Angela Merkel’s "situational moderating political style" and
the "sudden loss of state control over the German borders" had maneuvered the
CDU into a sandwich position between the far-right AfD and its "professionally stirred
fears of a disintegration of state authority and a division of society" on the one hand,
and the Greens with their "longings for a healthy world and a moral self-image" on
the other. Instead of this, Herdegen wants to develop a "coherent overall package"
from "guiding principles of the legally constituted community and the individual",
containing things like controlled immigration and tax cuts and Bundeswehr missions
and a European Union the use of which consists mostly in preventing the Italians
from dumping their fiscal burden on the "German citizen".
None of this is original. Herdegen’s vision is basically that everything will be fine and
as it used to be, hardly unusual for a conservative. But, I wonder, why would the
CDU need a constitutional law professor for this?
It was a bunch of constitutional law professors who marked the refugee crisis in
2015/16 as an emergency of the rule of law. They created the myth of the "rule
of lawlessness" that Horst Seehofer and the AfD so gratefully took up later. They
delegitimised the Dublin system and claimed a legal obligation for Germany to close
its borders. They contrasted the allegedly failed European refugee law system to a
vision of something compact and complete, round, intact, whole, "derived from the
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guiding principles of the legally constituted community and the individual". Matthias
Herdegen was, as far as I can see, silent at that time. Now he speaks.
This shining, round, wholesome, perfect thing is what Herdegen claims to offer,
and I wouldn’t be surprised if he will find quite a number of takers at the CDU party
conference. It’a highly attractive product for many in these unhomely times. What
the buyers should consider, however: whether something is round, compact and
complete can only be seen from the outside. To draw this picture, you have to step
out of it. You have to take a point outside of what you see in order to see the whole.
That is the reason why the experts for law, state, and order like so much to talk
about emergency, catastrophe, and war.
15 years ago, Herdegen had already been in the public spotlight, involuntarily
though. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde had sounded alarm in the FAZ about
Herdegen’s commentary on Article 1 of the Grundgesetz in that multi-volume
whopper of constitutional erudition called "Maunz/Dürig", the most renowned
commentary on the German constitution and still a tool many lawyers find
indispensable to find out what the law is. "Human dignity is inviolable", is what Article
1 famously proclaims, und up until 2003 it was taken as a matter of course that this
norm, the linchpin of the entire constitutional order, is exempt from balancing with
other competing rights and state interests. Not so Herdegen. That was a shock. He
seemed to suggest that inhumanity might in fact be conceivable under the Basic
Law in certain constellations, that the point outside of the law could and should be
internalized. What followed was a whole wave of post-9/11 "think the unthinkable"
constitutional fever fantasies, from citizen sacrifice to rescue torture, most of which is
remembered but in embarrassment today.
Herdegen’s offer, as tempting as it looks, is an empty shell. The order in which
we live is not compact, round and whole, it has never been and never will be. We
mortal beings will never get a glimpse at the whole of the legal order, only the lowly
internal perspective in which we meet all sorts of wild, frightening, inapprehensible
things all the time. Suddenly, 100,000 Syrians show up at the Rosenheim train
station and apply for asylum. What do we do? We try to find out who they are and
who is competent to handle their claims, and that takes time, and the Greeks don’t
cooperate, and at the end the transfer period has expired and we are responsible
for those fellows ourselves. Well, thank you very much. But that is what the Dublin
system does: making sure that someone, at the end, is responsible. Is that round?
Is it compact? Is that a "coherent overall package"? Of course not. But it is the order
that we have. And to work with it and honor it and improve it where it is politically
possible and obey it where it isn’t, instead of stepping out of it and seeking to replace
it with something whole and perfect – that is what conservatives do, right?
As opposed to, say, the AfD.
The crisis continues
Now to Poland: There, after the CJEU’s injunction, most of the forcibly retired
judges of the Supreme Court have returned to work at the request of their
- 2 -
President Ma#gorzata Gersdorf. From their own point of view and that of most
lawyers in Poland, they had never effectively retired anyway, and this view runs
parallel to the Luxembourg order to restore exactly the situation of 2 April 2018 at
the court with regard to the composition of the bench, competences and working
conditions.
With the order, the CJEU has entered uncharted territory, and the immense risk it
took became immediately apparent. The Polish government interprets the order
quite differently from the Supreme Court. From the government’s point of view, the
order only means that it is itself that is now called upon to implement it, and no-one
else – and before it has done so, the returning judges remain just cranky old retirees
incompetent to adjudicate. What the government seems to have in mind to placate
the CJEU is to have the retired judges be newly nominated by the National Judicial
Council and newly appointed by President Duda – which, as a desirable side-
effect, should also restore some of the PiS-subservient National Judicial Council’s
legitimacy. For the time being, however, the ousted Supreme Court judges have,
from the government’s point of view, no business to show up at the Court at all.
For the time being, the crisis has not been resolved at all – on the contrary: it is
entering a new phase. In legal terms, this also raises interesting questions as to the
direct effect of the CJEU’s temporary injunctions, an instrument which has only rarely
been used to date: Does the order apply directly or does it have to be implemented?
The former is supported by the fact that Article 19 TEU, the infringement of which is
at stake, applies directly itself, too. The second may be supported by the fact that the
order must not anticipate the decision in the main action. In the end, the CJEU will
have the opportunity to clarify this in its decision on the merits of the case. Until then,
the crisis will continue.
My thanks go to Ulrich Karpenstein, Walther Michl and Patryk Wachowiec for
immensely valuable input!
Collision course
DANIEL SARMIENTO looks with a worried frown at the revolution initiated by the
CJEU’s order: "Nothing appears to be stopping the Court from playing hardball in
this new chapter of European integration, in which 'integration through law' has now
turned, to the surprise and concern of us all, into 'integration through the rule of law'".
STANISLAW BIERNAT, former Vice-President of the Polish Constitutional Court,
and MONIKA KAWCZY#SKA analyze the move of the Polish Prosecutor General
and Minister of Justice to have referrals by Polish courts to the CJEU in matters of
judicial organisation declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal.
A head-on collision is also what the EU Commission and the Italian government
are racing towards at the moment. For the first time, the Commission has rejected
a draft budget plan from a member state as a violation of EU law, and violating EU
law was exactly what the Italian government had intended to do in the first place.
What is a Union supposed to do with a member state that deliberately breaks the
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law and, when confronted, takes a thuggish sue-me position? That question calls for
an urgent answer in Italy as well as in Poland. PAUL DERMINE explains the legal
background.
Slovakia is rarely mentioned in terms of illiberal democracy nowadays. But what the
Slovak parliament has done this week with regard to the appointment of judges to
the constitutional court, does not give rise to much  hope at all, as MAX STEUER
reports.
In Hungary, the Fidesz government plans once again to change the electoral law for
the upcoming European elections and also grant Hungarians outside the EU the right
to vote. Normal procedure or manipulation? VIKTOR KAZAI believes there is a lot to
be said for both.
In Slovenia it is the Supreme Court that gives cause for alarm. Displeased with a
decision of the European Court of Human Rights, it announced by a simple press
release and without any justification that it would only take note of  judgments from
Strasbourg as long as they are "persuasive". MATEJ AVBELJ reports.
All European threatening events of this week possibly pale in comparison to the
threat the fifth-largest country of the world is facing at its presidential election this
weekend: Brazil. DIEGO WERNECK ARGUELHES and THOMAZ PEREIRA
describe in a two-part article what legal change the right-wing extremist Jair
Bolsonaro should bring forth if he is elected, and what the prospects of the judiciary
are to check his assaults.
Does the success of the autocrats in Poland and Hungary discredit the concept
of constitutional pluralism? It depends, says MICHAL OVÁDEK, pointing out that
overlapping constitutional orders are part of empirical reality in Europe.
India, the world’s largest democracy, is at a crossroads, and the Supreme Court,
according to TARUN KHAITAN’s analysis, is pulling in one direction and the BJP
majoritarian-nationalist government in the other.
In Germany, a major constitutional reform is taking place without anyone noticing.
It’s about federalism, as JOHANNES HELLERMANN explains, and will give the
federal level more powers to foster investments at the states and municipalities level
(German).
The European Court of Human Rights has issued a landmark ruling on the
preventive detention of soccer hooligans, and THOMAS FELTES provides ten brief
thoughts on the decision and its ramifications (German).
In Cuba, a constitutional reform is underway after the death of Fidel Castro.
Although it remains a one-party state that imprisons opposition members and
disallows free press, the concentration of power on the máximo líder will, according
to HANS HOSTEN and CHRISTIAN KAUFHOLD, loosen a little.
In Germany, women can marry each other, but with respect to parenting equal
treatment stops. LUCY CHEBOUT and ANNA THERESA RICHARZ call on the
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legislator to recognize that mother, mother and child make a family as well as any
other (German).
Elsewhere
JAN KEESEN and JACOB ULRICH report on the fundamental right on computer
integrity, which is to decorate the state constitution of Hesse in the future as part of
a so-called constitutional reform, which Hessians are called to vote parallel to the
state elections on this Sunday, presented by thoroughly underwhelmed CARSTEN
SCHÜTZ.
MARCO MEYER comes to the conclusion that the European Parliament was correct
in handling abstentions at the vote on the Article 7 procedure against Hungary as
not having been cast (all German).
THOMAS PERROUD criticises the impact of the case law of the French
Constitutional Council, which restrains the legislator from enacting effective
transparency rules for lobbyists (French).
RAFAEL BUSTOS GISBERT strongly advocates a fundamental reform of the
Spanish Constitution (Spanish).
ROSALIND ENGLISH reports on the judgement of the European Court of Human
Rights in the case of an Austrian woman who was criminally convicted for
describing the Prophet Mohammed as a pedophile.
ALEXANDER HUDSON finds that the constitutional experiment in Iceland wrongly
referred to as "crowdsourcing constitution" – long-time readers of Verfassungsblog
may remember it – may be given another chance at last.
So long for this week. All the best, and take care,
Max Steinbeis
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